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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
In the time of wooden sailing ships and docks, the tide, currents, and available 
manpower were the forces that had the most profound effect on marine transportation.2 
Today, ships, ports, and facilities are run by sophisticated computers and software systems. 
These systems control, among other things, vessel engines,3 navigation,4 and facility 
automation.5 While many of these systems are covered by patents6 and involve trade 
secrets,7 they remain vulnerable to cyber-attacks because of their increasingly integrated 
nature. Indeed, depending on the target and level of severity, a cyber-attack could cause 
serious economic8 and environmental impacts. For example, the Exxon Valdez grounding, 
which caused one of the largest oil spills in U.S. history, involved a release of 257,000 
barrels of oil from a total of 1.2 million barrels that the vessel was carrying.9 For 
comparison, modern crude oil carriers can carry up to 2.2 million barrels of crude oil.10 A 
cyber-attack that successfully disrupted a crude carrier’s navigation or steering, resulting in 
the vessel grounding, could cause an oil spill much more devastating than Exxon Valdez.  
                                                 
2 Chris Oxlade, History of Sailing Ships, Q-FILES, https://www.q-files.com/technology/ships-and-
boats/history-of-sailing-ships/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2016).  
3 Automation and Marine Software, ABB, http://new.abb.com/marine/systems-and-
solutions/automation-and-marinesoftware (last visited Nov. 11, 2016) (ABB is an industrial technology 
company that sells marine software for monitoring and automation on vessels). 
4 TALK OF THE NATION: SCIENCE FRIDAY, HOW LARGE SHIPS USE NAVIGATION SYSTEMS (Nat’l Pub. 
Radio Jan. 20, 2012). http://www.npr.org/2012/01/20/145525012/how-large-ships-use-navigation-
systems. 
5 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE GAO-14-459, MARITIME CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROTECTION: DHS NEEDS TO BETTER ADDRESS PORT CYBERSECURITY 4 (2014) (“maritime 
stakeholders rely on numerous types of information and communications technologies to manage the 
movement of cargo throughout ports.”). 
6 Cf. Press Release, ABB, ABB Again Heads List for Most Patent Applications Filed by a Swiss-based 
Company (Feb. 26, 2015), 
http://www.abb.com/cawp/seitp202/67a510c11e3e4656c1257df7005309a2.aspx (last visited Feb. 3, 
2017).  
7 See, e.g., L-3 Comm. Westwood Corp. v. Robichaux, No. 06-279, 2008 WL 577560 (E.D. La. Feb. 
29, 2008). 
8 Matthew Chambers & Mindy Liu, Maritime Trade and Transportation by the Numbers, U.S. DEP’T 
OF TRANSP., 
http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/by_the_numbers/maritime_trade_an
d_transportation/index.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2016) (according to 2011 data, 53% of U.S. import 
value and 38% of U.S. export value was by vessel, the largest share of any mode of transportation); 
Lily Hay Newman, What if a Cybersecurity Attack Shut Down Our Ports?, SLATE (May 11 2015, 11:16 
AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/05/maritime_cybersecurity_ports_are_uns
ecured.html (last visited Nov. 11 2016) (“90 percent of the world’s goods are shipped on boats.”). 
9 Oil Spill Facts: Questions and Answers About the Spill, EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL TRUSTEE 
COUNCIL, http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/%3FFA=facts.QA (last visited Nov. 1, 2016). 
10 Today in Energy: September 16, 2014, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=17991 (last visited Oct. 22, 2016) (very large crude 
carriers are responsible for most global crude oil shipments, and carry between 1.9 million and 2.2 
million barrels of crude oil).  
2https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol8/iss2/3




This significant and developing threat to the marine transportation sector has been 
the subject of comparatively little regulation and guidance. While parts of the Maritime 
Transportation and Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) can be read to include cyber 
vulnerabilities, the Act was not originally written with this threat in mind.11 In February 
2016, the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) and several other influential 
maritime associations released “The Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships.”12 The 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) followed suit in June 2016, releasing interim 
guidelines addressing cyber risk.13 Additionally, the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) 
released a series of volumes addressing cybersecurity for marine and offshore facilities, the 
first published in February 2016.14  
Given that maritime cybersecurity is a relatively new area of emphasis, this Note 
will look to develop a foundation from which to build future research and 
recommendations. This Note will first provide an overview of the maritime industry and 
highlight industry reliance on integrated systems. Section II will survey current United 
States government regulations and approaches, including methods found in the critical 
infrastructure sector. Section III will examine the recently promulgated industry guidance. 
From this data, this Note will posit some basic procedural, regulatory, and legislative 
suggestions to assist the maritime industry in continuing to protect its critical intellectual 






















                                                 
11 Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002) (“An Act 
To amend the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, to establish a program to ensure greater security for United 
States seaports, and for other purposes.”). 
12 BALTIC & INT’L MAR. COUNCIL, infra note 224. 
13 INT’L MAR. ORG., infra note 251. 
3Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2017
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A. The Importance of Marine Transportation  
 
According to findings for the 2002 Maritime Transportation and Security Act, the 
United States has 361 public ports.15 Maritime ports in the U.S. handle over $1.3 trillion in 
cargo annually.16 A significant disruption of the marine transportation sector would cause 
severe economic complications, especially if it impacted one of our top twenty-five ports.17 
Ports and port facilities are vulnerable to cyber-attacks because they rely on 
communications and information technologies to achieve cargo movement within the 
port.18 These systems include terminal operating systems, industrial control systems, 
business operations systems, and access control and monitoring systems.19 In 2014, “a 
major U.S. port facility suffered a system disruption which shut down multiple ship-to-
shore cranes for several hours.”20 Protection of Maritime Critical Infrastructure21 is crucial 
for American prosperity and security. A cyber-attack at a port could have a ripple effect that 
impacts other critical infrastructure sectors.22 
Marine transportation is not specifically called out as one of the sixteen critical 
infrastructure sectors23 identified in Presidential Policy Directive Twenty-One, however, it 
can be considered a subset of the “Transportations Systems” sector.24 All of the sectors rely, 
to a certain degree, on the goods that make their way through U.S. ports.25 However, the 
sectors most likely to be significantly affected by a port disruption are Transportation 
Systems, Critical Manufacturing, Chemical, Energy, Food and Agriculture, and 
Commercial Facilities.26  
                                                                                                                
14 1 AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING, infra note 264. 
15 Maritime Transportation Security Act § 101(1) (2002). 
16 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 4 at 1. 
17 Maritime Transportation Security Act § 101(5) (“Twenty-five United States ports account for 98 
percent of all container shipments.”). 
18 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 4 at 4. 
19 Id. at 4–5. 
20 U.S. COAST GUARD, CYBER STRATEGY 17 (2015), 
https://www.uscg.mil/seniorleadership/DOCS/cyber.pdf. 
21 Id. at 31 (“Maritime Critical Infrastructure includes the ports, facilities, vessels, and related systems 
that facilitate trade within the U.S., support national defense and homeland security objectives, and 
connect the Nation to the global supply chain.”). 
22 OFFICE OF CYBER & INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS, CONSEQUENCES TO SEAPORT OPERATIONS FROM 
MALICIOUS CYBER ACTIVITY 12-16 (March 3, 2016, 13:00 EST), https://public.intelligence.net/dns-
seaport-cyber-attacks. 
23 The White House, Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21, Critical Infrastructure Security and 
Resilience (Feb. 12, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-
policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil  (the sectors are: Chemical, Commercial 
Facilities, Communications, Critical Manufacturing, Dams, Defense Industrial Base, Emergency 
Services, Energy, Financial Services, Food and Agriculture, Government Facilities, Healthcare and 
Public Health, Information Technology, Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste, Transportation 
Systems, and Water and Wastewater Systems). 
24 Id. 
25 OFFICE OF CYBER & INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS, supra note 21. 
26 Id. 
4https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol8/iss2/3




A large number of industries included in the critical manufacturing sector are 
dependent “upon ‘just-in-time’ supply chains.”27 These industries can be significantly 
impacted by a disruption in port operations, leading to an interruption of the supply chain.28 
This could force companies within this sector to reduce or even halt production until port 
operations are normalized or another source of supply (not involving the impacted port(s)) 
is found.29 
Another sector that relies on “just-in-time” supplies is the commercial facilities 
sector.30 Companies in this sector keep limited inventory on hand, thus a port disruption 
could negatively impact business by disrupting the supply chain.31 Indeed, it was projected 
that the West Coast ports labor slowdown in 2014–2015 “would cost the retail industry $7 
billion in 2015 . . . due to missed sales, below optimal inventory levels, and the higher price 
of moving goods during the slowdown.”32 
The food and agriculture sector would also be negatively impacted by a maritime 
industry disruption.33 In 2014, sixty-five percent of agricultural imports and seventy-three 
percent of exports were waterborne.34 Temporary restrictions or closures of ports or 
waterways can increase product spoilage, leading to lost sales, and cause diversion to other 
transportation modes or ports, leading to higher transportation costs.35 Additionally, a port 
disruption could lead to a shortage of products that are traditionally imported, such as sugar, 
coffee, and certain fruits and vegetables.36 
                                                 
27 Id. at 12. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 OFFICE OF CYBER & INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS, supra note 21 at 12. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. (citing Courtney Reagan, West Coast Ports: Retail’s $7 Billion Problem, CNBC (Feb. 9, 2015, 
12:58 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/02/09/west-coast-ports-retails-7-billion-problem.html; Sarah 
Halzack, Why a Major Backup at West Coast Ports Could Cost the Retail Industry Billions, 
WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 17, 2015) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/02/17/why-
a-major-backup-at-west-coast-ports-could-cost-the-retail-industry-billions/. 
33 OFFICE OF CYBER & INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 13. 
34 Brian McGregor, A Reliable Waterway System is Important to Agriculture, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
AGRIC. MKTG. SERV. 1 (Oct. 2015), 
https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/Importance%20of%20Waterways%2010-2014.pdf. 
35 Id. at 7. 
36 OFFICE OF CYBER & INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 13.  
5Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2017
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The Energy Sector still relies on foreign oil imports—in 2015, petroleum 
imported from foreign countries constituted approximately twenty-four percent of 
petroleum consumption in the U.S.37 This corresponded to about 9.4 million barrels per 
day.38 In addition, the U.S. exported approximately 4.7 million barrels per day of petroleum 
to other countries.39 In 2014, fifty-five percent of all daily petroleum imports into the U.S. 
were through maritime shipping.40 A cyber-attack that disrupted crude oil imports could 
cause a temporary increase in the instability of gasoline prices and potentially cause 
regional shortages (depending on the length and scope of the disruption).41 The Chemical 
Sector similarly relies on imports and exports.42 A port disruption could cause increased 
prices and, if a significant disruption in the chemical supply chain occurs, production of 
manufactured chemicals could be hampered.43 
Goods and products are regularly offloaded from ships and transferred to other 
modes of transportation such as rail and truck. Thus, the impact to the transportation sector 
would not only be an impact to maritime transport, but would likely also affect truck and 
rail transport.44 Additionally, a major port disruption could cause impacted companies to 
ship their goods by air freight, possibly “caus[ing] congestion within the logistic chains of 
air freight companies, leading to delays in the movement of goods.”45 Shipping by air 
freight is typically more expensive, increasing costs for the businesses and potentially 
negatively impacting the economy.46 
As discussed above, the maritime industry is critical to the prosperity of the 
United States. However, ships not only carry “the majority of freight arriving and departing 
from the U.S.,” they move “the bulk of critical military cargoes around the globe.”47 Thus, a 
maritime disruption could present a grave risk to national security. In considering the 
critical role that marine transportation plays, the vulnerabilities of the interconnected 
systems that ports and vessels rely on must also be considered. 
 
                                                 
37 Frequently Asked Questions: How much oil consumed by the United States comes from foreign 
countries?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=32&t=6 (last visited 
Dec. 21, 2016) (“Petroleum includes crude oil and petroleum products. Petroleum products include 
gasoline, diesel fuel, heating oil, jet fuel, chemical feedstocks, asphalt, biofuels (ethanol and biodiesel) 
and other products”). 
38 Frequently Asked Questions: How much petroleum does the United States import and export?, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=727&t=6 (last visited Dec. 21, 
2016). 
39 Id. 
40 OFFICE OF CYBER & INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 14. 
41 Id. 




46 Tiffany Hsu, Air Freight Firms are Bustling Amid Bottlenecks at West Coast Ports, LA TIMES (Feb. 
20, 2015, 2:19 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-air-cargo-20150221-story.html. 
47 WALLISCHECK, infra note 50 at 1. 
6https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol8/iss2/3




B. The Necessity of Integrated Systems in the Maritime Industry 
 
 Vessels and ports rely heavily on information systems and communications to 
control security, communication, navigation, cargo movement and tracking, equipment 
operation, and business operations.48 Given the emerging Internet of Things (IoT), and the 
fact that the original concept of IoT was to improve efficiency in manufacturing,49 it is not 
surprising the that the maritime industry is using similar technology. Since the typical 
commercial vessel spends most of its time at sea, hardwired communications and human 
couriers are not available to carry information. Thus, a ship truly is a “thing” in IoT 
parlance50—a typical ship contains hundreds of sensors and systems that can be remotely 
accessed. Such industrial control systems (ICS) are truly pervasive—“[t]hey are aboard 
virtually [every] ship and in the shore-side infrastructure supporting them.”51 Many of these 
systems are integrated to improve vessel or port efficiency.52 While not all systems are 
directly connected to the Internet, their inter-connected nature leaves them vulnerable.53 
Significantly, “[f]ailure of any one of these systems can produce cascading impacts in other 
systems and amplify the disruption to operations.”54 
 Many ICS use commercial off-the-shelf technologies that are ripe for 
exploitation.55 These systems are network-based and utilize widely available 
communication protocols and standard operating systems.56 Additionally, many of these 
systems are Internet Protocol (IP) addressable.57 This upsurge in the usage of IP addressable 












                                                 
48 OFF. OF CYBER & INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS, supra note 21 at 3. 
49 Robin Kester, Note, Demystifying the Internet of Things: Industry Impact, Standardization Problems, 
and Legal Considerations, 8 ELON L. REV. 205, 206 (2016). 
50 See Id. 
51 Eric York Wallischeck, ICS Security in Maritime Transportation,, JOHN A. VOLPE NATIONAL 
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS CENTER, 1 (2013), https://ntl.bts.gov/lib/48000/48000/48074/DOT-
VNTSC-MARAD-13-01.pdf. 
52 OFF. OF CYBER & INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS, supra note 21 at 7. 
53 “Even limited connection to the Internet exposes control systems to all of the inherent vulnerabilities 
of interconnected computer networks, including viruses, worms, hackers and terrorists.”  
WALLISCHECK, supra note 50 at 12.  
54 OFF. OF CYBER & INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS, supra note 21 at 7. 
55 WALLISCHECK, supra note 50 at 11. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 12. 
58 Id. at 9. 
7Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2017
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C. The Gravity of the Cyber Threat 
 
In 2013, a research team from the University of Texas at Austin successfully used 
a GPS spoofing device to gain control of a ship’s navigation system and subtly shift an $80 
million yacht off its course.59 The yacht was tricked onto a parallel course that was several 
hundred meters from its intended one.60 While the Texas team was conducting the 
experiment in international waters, 30 miles offshore of Italy, an attack that shifted a vessel 
several hundred meters off course when it was closer to land or near navigation hazards 
could have serious consequences.61 Unfortunately, this is not an isolated incident. 
Researchers have discovered potential vulnerabilities in all transportation modes (including 
maritime), involving a broad range of technologies.62 
While the highly publicized Stuxnet attack in 2010 was not directed at the 
maritime industry, “it is important to recognize that the same techniques used in that 
incident could be used to disable comparable systems used worldwide . . . including the safe 
and reliable movement of cargo and passengers.”63 Thankfully, the marine transportation 
system has not suffered a significant cyber-attack. However, major disruptions to port 
operations can cause wide-ranging impacts to the American economy.64 Commentators 
have stated that a “broad-based cyber-attack” on the marine transportation system that 
slowed or halted movement of cargo, could have significant economic impact.65 “While a 
cyber-attack that disables a vessel transiting the Panama Canal may only affect a single 
waterway, it can have significant economic impact around the globe.”66 Thus, the 
significant threat presented by cyber-terrorism should not be ignored.    
                                                 
59 Univ. of Tex. at Austin News, UT Austin Researchers Successfully Spoof an $80 million Yacht at Sea 




62 WALLISCHECK, supra note 50 at 2. 
63 Id. at 14. 
64 See supra Section I. A. 
65 WALLISCHECK, supra note 50 at 2. 
66 Id. 
8https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol8/iss2/3




II. CURRENT GOVERNMENTAL REGULATIONS AND APPROACHES 
Cybersecurity is a topic that has gained significant awareness in the public 
consciousness.67 Cyber-attacks are becoming more prominent and egregious in nature.68 
Much of the publicity has related to data breaches at major retailers69 and banks,70 but the 
maritime industry has occasionally gained the spotlight.71 However, “the American public 
is generally unaware of . . . the impact that [Maritime Transportation System] disruptions 
pose to national security and economic stability. To most Americans, ships are floating 
hotels that travel to exotic ports . . . .”72 This makes the risks to maritime transportation 
“often invisible” to the public.73  
The United States government has continued to increase its focus on 
cybersecurity. President Obama recognized that “[c]yber incidents are a fact of 
contemporary life, and significant cyber incidents are occurring with increasing frequency, 
implicating public and private infrastructure located in the United States and abroad.”74 
Current cybersecurity regulations and laws are piecemeal but are continuing to evolve.75 
 
A. Marine Transportation 
 
The principal laws that cover maritime security are the Maritime Transportation 
Security Act and the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act. 
 
                                                 
67 CHARLES BEARD ET AL, US CYBERSECURITY: PROGRESS STALLED, KEY FINDINGS FROM THE 2015 
US STATE OF CYBERCRIME SURVEY 4 (2015), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/increasing-it-
effectiveness/publications/us-cybercrime-survey-2015.html (suggesting that “the term ‘data breach’ 
[has] become part of the broader public vernacular . . . .”). 
68 Id. 
69 Michael Kassner, Anatomy of the Target Data Breach: Missed opportunities and lessons learned, 
ZDNET (Feb. 2, 2015, 8:29 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/anatomy-of-the-target-data-breach-
missed-opportunities-and-lessons-learned/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2016). 
70 Portia Crowe, JPMorgan Fell Victim to the Largest Theft of Customer Data from a Financial 
Institution in US History, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 10, 2015, 10:12 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/jpmorgan-hacked-bank-breach-2015-11 (last visited Nov. 8, 2016). 
71 See Univ. of Tex. at Austin News, supra note 58. 
72 WALLISCHECK, supra note 50 at 2. 
73 Id. 
74 THE WHITE HOUSE, PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE/PPD-41, UNITED STATES CYBER INCIDENT 
COORDINATION (July 26, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/26/presidential-
policy-directive-united-states-cyber-incident. 
75 Chris Laughlin, Student Note, Cybersecurity in Critical Infrastructure Sectors: A Proactive 
Approach to Ensure Inevitable Laws and Regulations are Effective, 14 COLO. TECH. L.J. 345, 351 
(2016). 
9Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2017
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1. Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 
 
The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) was enacted in November 
2002.76 MTSA implements requirements for increased security in United States waterways, 
coastal areas, and ports.77 The Act does not specifically address cybersecurity; however, it 
does require the development of Area Maritime Security (AMS) Plans, Vessel Security 
Plans, and Facility Security Plans.78 These plans are designed to help ports, facilities, and 
vessels to prepare for and deter transportation security incidents.79 
The Security and Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE Port Act) was 
enacted in October 2006.80 The Act is designed “[t]o improve maritime and cargo security 
through enhanced layered defenses . . . .”81 The SAFE Port Act amended some MTSA 
provisions and also introduced new initiatives and programs. The latter included 
establishing a port security exercise program and directing the development of a strategic 
plan to enhance the security of the international supply chain.82 
One critical aspect of MTSA was that it prompted the establishment of AMS 
Committees.83 These committees have several key responsibilities, including identifying 
“critical port infrastructure and operations,” identifying risks, and determining “mitigation 
strategies and implementation methods.”84 In addition, the committees are responsible for 
developing processes to continually evaluate security and assist in developing AMS Plans.85 
AMS Plans are based on the AMS Assessments that were directed by MTSA.86 
                                                 
76 Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002). 
77Id. 
78 46 U.S.C.A. § 70103 (2010). 
79 Id.; 46 U.S.C.A. § 70101(6) (2006) (“The term ‘transportation security incident’ means a security 
incident resulting in a significant loss of life, environmental damage, transportation system disruption, 
or economic disruption in a particular area.”). 
80 Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884 (2006). 
81 Id. 
82 6 U.S.C.A. §§ 912, 941 (2016). 
83 33 C.F.R. §§ 103.300, 103.305(a) (2016). “An AMS Committee will be composed of not less than 
seven members . . . who may be selected from—(1) The Federal, Territorial, or Tribal government; (2) 
The State government and political subdivisions thereof; (3) Local public safety, crisis management 
and emergency response agencies; (4) Law enforcement and security organizations; (5) Maritime 
industry, including labor; (6) Other port stakeholders having a special competence in maritime security; 
and (7) Port stakeholders affected by security practices and policies.” Id. § 103.305(a). 
84 Id. § 103.310(a). 
85 Id. §103.310(a)(4). 
86 46 U.S.C.A. § 70102(b) (2016) (stating that “the Secretary shall conduct a detailed vulnerability 
assessment of the facilities and vessels that may be involved in a transportation security incident.”). 
These assessments shall be updated “at least every 5 years.” Id. § 70102(b)(3). See also 33 C.F.R. §§ 
103.400, 103.500. 
10https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol8/iss2/3




AMS Assessments must: (1) identify critical port infrastructure and operations; 
(2) include a threat assessment identifying and evaluating potential threats; (3) include an 
assessment of consequences and vulnerabilities; and (4) make a security measures 
determination.87 In meeting the specified elements, the assessment is to consider a number 
of variables including, but not limited to, physical security, security capabilities and 
resources, and “[r]adio and telecommunication systems, including computer systems and 
networks.”88 While the latter does not directly reference cybersecurity, it can be used to 
read the inclusion of cyber threats into MTSA. Furthermore, both Vessel Security Plans and 
Facility Security Plans required under MTSA must include information relating to 
communications and security systems.89 Security plans must be updated every five years.90  
A June 2014 report on maritime critical infrastructure by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) found that area maritime and facility security plans contained 
limited cybersecurity coverage.91 The GAO attributed the limited coverage to the fact that 
the 2012 National Maritime Strategic Risk assessment developed by the Coast Guard did 
not address cyber risks in the maritime environment.92 In testimony before the House 
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, Gregory C. Wilshusen, Director of 
Information Security Issues for the GAO, noted that while the 2014 National Maritime 
Strategic Risk Assessment did identify cyber as a threat vector, it did not “fully address[] 
threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences of cyber incidents . . . .”93 Director Wilshusen 
concluded that until this threat is more fully addressed, the “ability to appropriately plan 
and allocate resources for protecting maritime-related critical infrastructure” will be 
hindered.94 The National Maritime Strategic Risk Assessment is conducted biennially,95 
with the next due in 2016.  
 
                                                 
87 33 C.F.R. § 103.405(a). 
88 Id. § 103.405(b)(5). 
89 See id. §§ 104.405, 105.405. 
90 46 U.S.C.A. § 70103(c)(3)(G) (2016). 
91 Maritime Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Needs to Better Address Port Cybersecurity, supra 
note 4, at 16. 
92 Id. (the 2012 assessment was the most current available at the time of the report). 
93 DHS Needs to Enhance Efforts to Address Port Cybersecurity: Hearing on Maritime Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Before the H. Subcomm. on Border and Maritime Security, H. Comm. on 
Homeland Security, 114th Cong. 7 (2015) (statement of Gregory C. Wilshusen, Dir., Info. Security 
Issues, Gov’t Accountability Off.). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 6. 
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2. Port Security Grant Program 
 
MTSA also introduced the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP)96 to help ports 
with funding for the security requirements it mandated.97 The Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) administers the program and consults with the U.S. Coast 
Guard, among others, to make award decisions.98 The grant program was designed to 
allocate funds based on risk.99 
The fiscal year (FY) 2014 PSGP Funding Opportunity Announcement (FOA) 
allowed applicants to request funding for cybersecurity vulnerability assessments.100 
Vulnerability assessments had not been something typically funded under PSGP; however, 
the FOA noted that “considering the relative newness of Cybersecurity as a priority within 
the program and the need to develop and enhance the voluntary Cybersecurity Framework, 
vulnerability assessments may be funded as contracted costs.”101 The FY 2014 PSGP also 
stated that cybersecurity was one of the funding focus areas.102 FY 2014 was only the 
second year that cyber was considered a major funding priority.103 Cybersecurity remained 
an identified funding priority in 2015 and 2016.104 
                                                 
96 46 U.S.C.A. § 70107 (2016). 
97 Commander Joseph Kramek, The Critical Infrastructure Gap: U.S. Port Facilities and Cyber 
Vulnerabilities, CTR. FOR 21ST CENTURY SEC. AND INTELLIGENCE 9 (July 2013), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/03-cyber-port-security-kramek.pdf. 
98 Id. 
99 46 U.S.C.A. § 70107(a) (2016) (“In administering the grant program, the Secretary shall take into 
account national economic, energy, and strategic defense concerns based upon the most current risk 
assessments available.”). 
100 Funding Opportunity Announcement: FY 2014 Port Security Grant Program, FED. EMERGENCY 
MGMT. AGENCY 38 (2014), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1396623742630-
9e497a99bef3e3c0265bbf84993b5e69/FY_2014_PSGP_FOA_Final_Revised.pdf. 
101 Id. 
102 FY 2014 Port Security Grant Program Fact Sheet, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY 2 (2014), 
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1406300857129-
09e62587b8f79e748c585e37cdba09a9/PSGP_Fact%20Sheet_Final.pdf. 
103 Looking back as far as 2005, 2013 was the first year that cyber was specifically called out as a major 
funding priority. See generally Port Security Grant Program, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, 
https://www.fema.gov/port-security-grant-program (last visited Mar. 27, 2017) (wherein FY 2005 data 
is the earliest available on the FEMA PSGP website). 
104 FY 2015 Port Security Grant Program Fact Sheet, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY 2 (2015), 
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1438021685566-
9cf51877eec3f17c6495b672334eb050/FY_2015_PSGP_Fact_Sheet_Allocations.pdf; FY 2016 Port 








However, while cybersecurity was identified as a funding priority in 2014, the 
national review panel for grants did not reach out to any cyber subject matter experts to 
assist it in making decisions about which cyber-related grants were most worthy of 
funding.105 For the 2015 grants, FEMA did report that “they have consulted with the Coast 
Guard’s Cyber Command on high-dollar-value cyber projects and that Cyber Command 
officials sat on the review panel for one day to review several other cyber projects.”106 
However, FEMA provided no formal written guidelines to ensure that grant reviewers 
consulted appropriate cyber expertise in either the field (captain of the port) level or 
national level review process.107 The FY 2016 Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) did 
contain a more detailed discussion of cybersecurity than previous years, however, it still did 
not require that grant reviewers consult cyber professionals when reviewing cyber 
projects.108  
 
B. Critical Infrastructure 
 
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) lays the foundation for 
private sector and government entities in the critical infrastructure community to work 
together to ensure critical infrastructure safety and resilience through proper risk 
management practices.109 NIPP advocates an approach through public-private partnership, 
ensuring that all stakeholders in the critical infrastructure community are represented.110 
The 2013 NIPP update is consistent with Executive Order 13636, “Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cybersecurity,”111 and Presidential Policy Directive 21, “Critical 
Infrastructure Security and Resilience.”112 
 
                                                 
105 DHS Needs to Enhance Efforts to Address Port Cybersecurity, supra note 92, at 9. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Notice of Funding Opportunity: FY 2016 Port Security Grant Program, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. 
AGENCY 40 (2016), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1455573875236-
07ce03a778118ecc2ead8e1aae84185e/FY_2016_PSGP_NOFO_FINAL.pdf. 
109 NIPP 2013: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC. 1–2 (2013), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/National-
Infrastructure-Protection-Plan-2013-508.pdf. 
110 Id. at 3. 
111 Exec. Order No. 13,636, infra note 112. 
112 NIPP 2013: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, supra note 108; 
Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21, supra note 22. 
13Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2017
244                       CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW                   [231: 244]   
 
 
1. Executive Order 13636 and Presidential Policy Directive 21 
 
In February 2013, President Obama signed Executive Order 13636, “Improving 
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.”113 This order recognized that “[t]he cyber threat to 
critical infrastructure . . . represents one of the most serious national security challenges we 
must confront.”114 It defined critical infrastructure broadly: “systems and assets, whether 
physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such 
systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic 
security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.”115 Arguably 
maritime critical infrastructure is covered under this definition. 
Executive Order 13636 stated that “[i]t is the policy of the United States to 
enhance the security and resilience of the Nation’s critical infrastructure and to maintain a 
cyber environment that encourages efficiency, innovation, and economic prosperity while 
promoting safety, security, business confidentiality, privacy, and civil liberties.”116 The 
Order promoted partnership between the government and the private sector, and sought to 
create an information sharing program that allowed for more timely sharing of information 
between the government and the private sector.117 In addition, the Order directed all 
agencies to ensure that civil liberties and privacy protections were considered and 
incorporated into any cyber-related activities.118 
On the same day that Executive Order 13636 was issued, President Obama also 
published Presidential Policy Directive Twenty-One (PPD-21), “Critical Infrastructure 
Security and Resilience.”119 The sixteen critical infrastructure sectors recognized by PPD-
21 were each assigned a Federal Sector Specific Agency to lead the federal efforts.120 PPD-
21 focused on both the cyber and physical sides of critical infrastructure, and recognized the 
interconnected nature of infrastructure systems.121  
                                                 
113 Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739 (Feb. 12, 2013). 
114 Id. § 1. 
115 Id. § 2. 
116 Id. § 1. 
117 Id. § 4. 
118 Id. § 5. 
119 Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, supra note 22. 
120 Id. (“The term ‘Sector-Specific Agency’ (SSA) means the Federal department or agency designated 








PPD-21 set three strategic imperatives to shape the Federal government 
approach.122 The first imperative directs implementation of a “national unity of effort,” 
designed to increase situational awareness and clarify relationships between public and 
private stakeholders.123 The second imperative focuses on ensuring efficient information 
exchange, both within the government and with the operators and owners of critical 
infrastructure.124 Like Executive Order 13636, PPD-21 stresses that information sharing 
“must be done while respecting privacy and civil liberties.”125 The final strategic imperative 
focuses on an “integration and analysis function,” and seeks to use this function to inform 
both planning and operational decision making.126 
 
2. National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity 
Framework 
 
Executive Order 13636 also directed the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) “to lead the development of a framework to reduce cyber risks to 
critical infrastructure.”127 The order directed that “[t]he Cybersecurity Framework shall 
include a set of standards, methodologies, procedures, and processes that align policy, 
business, and technological approaches to address cyber risks.”128 
The NIST Framework was promulgated on February 12, 2014, one year to the 
day after Executive Order 13636.129 The Framework was collaboratively developed by both 
governmental and private sector entities and identified “a set of industry standards and best 
practices . . . .”130 Use of the Framework is voluntary and it is designed to complement, 
rather than replace, existing processes and programs.131 The Framework is broken down 
into “three parts: the Framework Core, the Framework Implementation Tiers, and the 
Framework Profiles.”132 
                                                 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, supra note 22. “(2) Enable effective information 
exchange by identifying baseline data and systems requirements for the Federal Government;…” 
125 Id. see also, Exec. Order No. 13636, supra note 112 at § 5(a). 
126 Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21, supra note 22. NOTE: maybe use quote, “(3) Implement an 
integration and analysis function to inform planning and operations decisions regarding critical 
infrastructure.” 
127 Exec. Order No. 13636, supra note 112, at § 7(a). 
128 Id. 
129 NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
CYBERSECURITY (2014), 
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-framework-
021214.pdf (last visited April 20, 2017). 
130 Id. at 1. 
131 Id. at 4. 
132 Id. 
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The Framework Core is based on five functions that are concurrent and should be 
continuously considered.133 The functions are “Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, [and] 
Recover,”134 and are designed to represent a strategic, birds-eye (“high-level”) view of 
cybersecurity risk.135 The functions are further broken down into categories (functional 
groups)136 and subcategories137 (specific outcomes). In addition, informative references are 
given for each subcategory, capturing common practices used to achieve desired 
outcomes.138 
The Framework Implementation Tiers are designed to reflect the level at which an 
entities’ cybersecurity practices correspond to the risk management procedures described in 
the Framework.139 The Tiers cover a range that moves from a more informal and reactive 
response, to responses that are adaptive and “risk-informed.”140 The Tiers help “provide 
context on how an organization views cybersecurity risk and the processes in place to 
manage that risk.”141 In order to determine the most appropriate Tier to mitigate risk and 
feasibly meet organizational goals, each organization should consider their unique 
constraints, objectives, threat environment, and legal or regulatory requirements.142 
The Framework Profiles are the outcomes that organizations select from the 
Framework categories and subcategories based on their individual needs.143 A Profile can 
be particularly helpful in examining an organization’s current cybersecurity posture (i.e. “as 
is”) and comparing it with a target Profile (i.e. hope “to be”).144 This comparison can help 
an organization identify steps that need to be taken to reach cybersecurity protection 
goals.145 Organizations can have multiple Profiles, each aligned with particular cyber 
vulnerable business components and recognizing particular organizational needs.146 
                                                 
133 Id. 
134 NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
CYBERSECURITY (2014), 
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-framework-
021214.pdf (last visited April 20, 2017). 
135 Id. at 4. 
136 Id. at 7, 19 (Figure 1 (p. 7) and Table 1 (p. 19)). 
137 Id. at 8. “Subcategories further divide a Category into specific outcomes of technical and/or 
management activities. They provide a set of results that, while not exhaustive, help support 
achievement of the outcomes in each Category.” 
138 Id. 
139 NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
CYBERSECURITY 5 (2014), 
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-framework-
021214.pdf (last visited April 20, 2017). 
140 Id. at 5, 10 (the Tier definitions are: Tier 1 (Partial), Tier 2 (Risk Informed), Tier 3 (Repeatable), 
Tier 4 (Adaptive)). 
141 Id. at 9. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 5. 
144 NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
CYBERSECURITY 5 (2014), 
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-framework-
021214.pdf (last visited April 20, 2017). 
145 Id. at 11. 
146 Id. 
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The NIST Framework is a good starting point to strengthen cybersecurity 
programs. Additional standards developed collaboratively between the private sector and 
government should be encouraged. These additional standards could build on this initial 
Framework, adding to the depth and breadth of cybersecurity knowledge and showcasing 
best practices and procedures. Such additional collaborative products would benefit both the 
government and industry, helping maintain the security and resiliency of American critical 
infrastructure. The maritime industry has recognized the importance of the NIST 
Framework—all of the recently promulgated industry guidance cite the Framework and 
suggest incorporating many of its recommended practices.147 
 
3. United States Coast Guard Cyber Strategy 
Partially due to Executive Order 13636, the United States Coast Guard 
promulgated a Cyber Strategy in 2015.148 This Strategy designates infrastructure protection 
as one of the Coast Guard’s strategic priorities in the cyber domain.149 It identifies two 
goals and four strategies to help address cyber risks to maritime critical infrastructure.150 
Additionally, in 2013, the Coast Guard created a Cyber Command to coordinate its 
cybersecurity efforts.151 
The first goal of the strategy is the promotion of cyber risk awareness and 
management through risk assessment.152 This goal has two objectives: 1) “Improve Port-
Wide Cybersecurity Risk Assessment Tools and Methodologies,” and 2) “Improve 
Cybersecurity Information Sharing.”153 To achieve these objectives, the Coast Guard will 
seek to leverage currently existing cybersecurity risk assessment tools, including those 
currently employed by the Coast Guard, and those employed by other agencies and 
industries.154 It will also take steps to establish information sharing protocols and work with 
industry partners and other government agencies to facilitate information sharing across 
critical infrastructure sectors.155 
                                                 
147 See supra Section III. 
148 U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 19, at 5. 
149 Id. at 31. 
150 Id. at 32-33. 
151 Id. at 7. 
152 Id. at 32 (“The Coast Guard will incorporate cybersecurity into aspects of maritime operations in 
order to reduce the risk . . . and to continue to protect the nation’s maritime critical infrastructure and 
the American people.”). 
153 U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 19, at 32. 
154 Id.  
155 Id.  
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The second goal is aimed at prevention and seeks to “Reduce Cybersecurity 
Vulnerabilities.”156 This goal also has two objectives: 1) “Reduce Cyber Vulnerability for 
Vessels and Facilities,” and 2) “Incorporate Cybersecurity into Training and Education 
Requirements.”157 These objectives target development of guidance and education by 
working with industry partners, including international organizations, to determine best 
practices and protocols.158 
 
C. Recent Cybersecurity Legislation 
 
1. 2014 Cybersecurity Legislation 
 
Prior to December 2014, no cybersecurity laws had been enacted since the 
Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002.159 In December 2014, however, 
Congress approved five Acts related to cybersecurity.160 The legislation most closely 
related to critical infrastructure and marine transportation are the National Cybersecurity 
Protection Act of 2014 and the Cybersecurity Enforcement Act of 2014. 
 
                                                 
156 Id. at 33 (“Understanding the vulnerabilities associated with cyber systems enables the Coast Guard 
and the marine industry to take appropriate steps to reduce the risk to maritime cyber critical 
infrastructure from attack, exploitation, failure, or misuse.”). 
157 Id. 
158 U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 19, at 33. 
159 Lawrence J. Trautman, Article, Cybersecurity: What About U.S. Policy?, 2015 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & 
Pol’y 341, 344 (2015). 
160 Id. (these include the National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014, the Federal Information 
Security Modernization Act of 2014, the Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act, the Homeland 
Security Workforce Assessment Act, and the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014). 
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a. National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014 
 
The National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014 amends the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, adding a provision for a National Cybersecurity and Communications 
Integration Center (NCCIC).161 According to the Department of Homeland Security, 
NCCIC “is a 24x7 cyber situational awareness, incident response, and management center 
that is a national nexus of cyber and communications integration for the Federal 
Government, intelligence community, and law enforcement.”162 The mission of NCCIC is 
to decrease the severity and likelihood of events that may cause considerable compromise to 
the resilience and security of key national communications and information technology 
networks.163 
A recent policy letter released by the Coast Guard regarding MTSA regulated 
facilities and vessels allows certain cyber incidents to be reported to the NCCIC.164 The 
policy included cyber incidents in the definitions of reportable breaches of security and 
suspicious activity.165 It was also noted that “[p]lausible terrorist attack scenarios include 
combined cyber and physical incidents.”166 Once a cyber incident is reported, “the NCCIC 
may be able to provide technical assistance to the porting party.”167 
In addition to establishing the NCCIC, the Cybersecurity Protection Act contains 
a number of provisions addressing information sharing and required reports.168 
Furthermore, for the critical infrastructure sector, it requires the DHS under Secretary for 
Critical Infrastructure Protection and Cybersecurity to “develop, regularly update, maintain, 
and exercise adaptable cyber incident response plans to address cybersecurity risks . . . to 
critical infrastructure.”169 These plans are to be developed in coordination with appropriate 
Federal, State, local, and industry partners.170  
 
                                                 
161 Nat’l Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-282, 128 Stat. 3066 (2014).  
162 National Cybersecurity & Communications Integration Center, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY, https://www.dhs.gov/national-cybersecurity-and-communications-integration-center (last 
visited Dec. 22, 2016). 
163 Id. 
164 U.S. Coast Guard, Policy Letter on Reporting Suspicious Activity & Breaches of Security (Dec. 14, 
2016), https://homeport.uscg.mil (click on “Maritime Security” on the left menu bar and then “Policy.” 
This letter is listed as “CG-5P Policy Ltr No. 08-16, Reporting Suspicious Activity & Breaches of 
Security”) (Transportation Security Incidents are normally reported to the National Response Center. 
However, “cyber incidents that do not also involve physical or pollution effects” may now be reported 
“to the NCIC in lieu of the NRC . . . .”).  
165 Id. at ¶ 3.A & B. 
166 Id. at ¶ 2.D. 
167 Id. at ¶ 3.C.iii. 
168 Nat’l Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-282, 128 Stat. 3066 (2014). 
169 Id. at § 7. 
170 Id. 
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b. Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 
 
The Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 is “An Act to provide for an 
ongoing, voluntary public-private partnership to improve cybersecurity, and to strengthen 
cybersecurity research and development, workforce development and education, and public 
awareness and preparedness, and for other purposes.”171 Title I of the Act amends the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 272), adding provisions that 
strengthen public-private collaboration in the cybersecurity realm, including “on an ongoing 
basis, facilitate and support the development of a voluntary, consensus-based, industry-led 
set of standards . . . to cost-effectively reduce cyber risks to critical infrastructure.”172  
Title II of the act focuses on cybersecurity research and development.173 Among 
other provisions, it directs the development of a federal cybersecurity research and 
development strategic plan that is to be updated every four years and be “based on an 
assessment of cybersecurity risk to guide the overall direction of Federal cybersecurity and 
information assurance research and development . . . .”174 While this strategic plan is to 
guide Federal cybersecurity research, in developing and updating the plan, the government 
entities are to work closely with the private sector, including academia, industry, and 
interested stakeholders.175 This will allow the government to solicit recommendations and 
ensure that Federal research is not duplicating current private sector plans.176 
Title III of the Act involves education and workforce development.177 This 
portion of the Act promotes challenges and competitions to stimulate cybersecurity 
innovation and learning.178 It also codifies a scholarship-for-service program designed to 
train and recruit promising individuals to fulfil cybersecurity positions at the tribal, local, 
State, and Federal levels.179 Title IV, Cybersecurity Awareness and Preparedness, involves 
education.180 Specifically, it orders the NIST Director, in consultation with other 
appropriate agencies and stakeholders, “to coordinate a national cybersecurity awareness 
and education program . . . .”181 
Title V, Advancement of Cybersecurity Technical Standards, directs NIST to 
ensure coordination between agencies developing international technical information 
system security standards, to develop a cloud computing strategy for the Federal 
Government, and to support identity management research and development.182 In the first 
two tasks, NIST is explicitly directed to consult with “other relevant Federal agencies and 
stakeholders from the private sector.”183  
 
                                                 
171 Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-274, 128 Stat. 2971 (2014). 
172 Id. at § 101(a). 
173 Id. at § 201. 
174 Id. at § 201(a)(1). 
175 Id. at § 201(a)(2)(B). 
176 Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-274, 128 Stat. 2971 § 201(a)(2)(B) 
(2014). 
177 Id. at §§ 301-302. 
178 Id. at § 301. 
179 Id. at § 302. 
180 Id. at § 401. 
181 Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-274, 128 Stat. 2971 § 401(a). (2014). 
182 Id. at §§ 501-504. 
183 Id. at §§ 502-503. 
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2. Cybersecurity Act of 2015 and Recent Presidential Policy 
 
Information sharing has been one of the most consistently contentious issues 
across the cyber domain.184 Obstacles that have hindered information exchange include: the 
concerns that shared information could be used as evidence of failing to meet a regulatory 
standard, that after being shared with the government such information might be available 
to the public through a public records request, and concern over individual privacy rights.185 
The Cybersecurity Act of 2015 seeks to “facilitate and promote” timely information sharing 
across Federal and non-Federal entities to encourage sharing of information about cyber 
threats.186 
a. Cybersecurity Act of 2015 
 
The majority of the Cybersecurity Act is focused on information sharing.187 It 
requires the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security to develop procedures to 
promote timely sharing of cyber information.188 The Act also provides some key 
protections to private sector entities that share cybersecurity information.189 It exempts 
information from disclosure via the Freedom of Information Act and requires that entities 
sharing information remove material that identifies specific individuals.190 Additionally, the 
Act limits how federal, state, tribal, and local governments can use the information.191 It 
specifically states that information “shared with a State, tribal, or local government . . . shall 
not be used . . . to regulate, including an enforcement action, the lawful activity of any non-
Federal entity.”192 The federal government may only use the information for a limited 
number of purposes, including “a cybersecurity purpose,”193 identifying cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities or threats, or a purpose related to other specified threats.194 Additionally, the 
Act includes an entire section on “Protection from liability.”195 Legal commentators have 
suggested that such liability protection is a significant incentive to share information.196 The 
Act specifically states that “[n]o cause of action shall lie or be maintained in any court 
against any private entity, and such action shall be promptly dismissed . . .” for information 
shared in accordance with the Act.197  
 
                                                 
184 Peter Carey et al., President Obama Signs Cybersecurity Act of 2015 to Encourage Cybersecurity 
Information Sharing, NAT’L L. REV., (January 3, 2016). 
185 Id. 
186 6 U.S.C.A. § 1502 (2015). 
187 Peter Carey et al., supra note 182. 
188 6 U.S.C.A. § 1502 (2015). 
189 Peter Carey et al., supra note 182. 
190 6 U.S.C.A. § 1503 (2015). 
191 6 U.S.C.A. §§ 1503, 1504 (2015). 
192 6 U.S.C.A. § 1503(4)(C) (2015). 
193 6 U.S.C.A. § 1501 (2015) (“The term ‘cybersecurity purpose’ means the purpose of protecting an 
information system or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system 
from a cybersecurity threat or security vulnerability.”). 
194 6 U.S.C.A. § 1504(5)(A) (2015) (the other threats include death, serious bodily or economic harm, 
terrorist acts, “a serious threat to a minor,” fraud or identify theft, espionage, or trade secret protection).  
195 6 U.S.C.A. § 1505 (2015). 
196 Peter Carey et al, supra note 182. 
197 6 U.S.C.A. § 1505(a), (b) (2015). 
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b. 2016 Presidential Policy 
 
In February 2016, President Obama signed Executive Order 13718, creating a 
Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity under the Department of Commerce.198 
The Commission was made up of twelve members and included former government 
officials as well as representatives from academia and industry.199 Executive Order 13718 
directed the Commission to compile a report that included “detailed recommendations to 
strengthen cybersecurity in both the public and private sectors . . . .”200  
The report was completed on December 1, 2016, and highlighted the critical need 
for partnerships between the private and public sectors.201 The report identified six “major 
imperatives” which were further broken down into sixteen recommendations and fifty-three 
action items.202 The Commission felt “that most recommendations can and should begin in 
the near term, with many meriting action within the first 100 days of the new 
Administration.”203 The aim of the report was to make recommendations for actions that 
can be incorporated during the next decade to help increase cybersecurity in both the private 
and public sectors.204 
                                                 
198 Exec. Order No. 13718, 81 Fed. Reg. 29 (Feb. 9, 2016).  
199 Comm’n on Enhancing Nat’l Cybersecurity, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., 
https://www.nist.gov/cybercommission (last visited Jan. 23, 2017). 
200 Exec. Order No. 13718, supra note 197 at § 3. 
201 COMM’N ON ENHANCING NAT’L CYBERSECURITY, REPORT ON SECURING AND GROWING THE 
DIGITAL ECONOMY (Dec. 1, 2016), 
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016/12/02/cybersecurity-commission-report-final-
post.pdf.  
202 Id. at 2 (“The imperatives are: 1. Protect, defend, and secure today’s information infrastructure and 
digital networks. 2. Innovate and accelerate investment for the security and growth of digital networks 
and the digital economy. 3. Prepare consumers to thrive in a digital age. 4. Build cybersecurity 
workforce capabilities. 5. Better equip government to function effectively and securely in the digital 
age. 6. Ensure an open, fair, competitive, and secure global digital economy.”). 
203 Id.  
204 Exec. Order No. 13718, supra note 196, § 3. R4.1 
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The introduction to Presidential Policy Directive 41 (PPD-41), “United States 
Cyber Incident Coordination,” notes that U.S. infrastructure “is vulnerable to malicious 
activity, malfunction, human error, and acts of nature, placing the Nation and its people at 
risk. Cyber incidents are a fact of contemporary life, and significant cyber incidents are 
occurring with increasing frequency . . . .”205 PPD-41 highlights the shared responsibility of 
government, private sector, and individual stakeholders.206 Further, it delineates principles 
under which the Federal Government are to respond to cyber incidents (involving either 
private sector or government entities).207 For what the PPD termed “significant cyber 
incidents,”208 lead Federal agencies were designated “and an architecture for coordinating 
the broader Federal Government response” was established.209 PPD-41 mandated 
coordinated and “concurrent lines of effort” by federal agencies.210 The “concurrent lines of 
effort” are divided into four areas of response, three undertaken for all cyber incidents, and 
the fourth only when a federal government agency is the affected party.211 The first three 
areas are “threat response; asset response; and intelligence support and related activities.”212 
The final response area is “to manage the effects of the cyber incident on [the affected 
federal agency’s] operations, customers, and workforce.”213 
Threat response is focused on investigation, collecting evidence and intelligence, 
working to link related incidents, mitigation of any immediate threats, and other related 
tasks.214 Another goal is to “facilitat[e] information sharing and operational coordination 
with asset response.”215 Asset response provides technical assistance to the parties affected 
by cyber incidents, to help them “protect their assets, mitigate vulnerabilities, and reduce 
impacts of cyber incidents . . . .”216 Additionally, this area of response looks beyond the 
immediate threat vector to consider other entities and areas that may be vulnerable.217 Asset 
responders also assist by “providing guidance on how best to utilize Federal resources and 
capabilities in a timely, effective manner to speed recovery.”218 The threat and asset 
response areas are designed to be closely related and enhance communications and 
information sharing.219 The intelligence support activity focuses on building situational 
awareness, analyzing threats, identifying gaps, and gaining the ability to mitigate or degrade 
adversarial threat capabilities.220 
                                                 
205 Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-41, supra note 73. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208 Id.  § II.B (“Significant cyber incident. A cyber incident that is (or group of related cyber incidents 
that together are) likely to result in demonstrable harm to the national security interests, foreign 
relations, or economy of the United States or to the public confidence, civil liberties, or public health 
and safety of the American people.”). 
209 Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-41 § I, supra note 73. 
210 Id.  § IV. 
211 Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-41, supra note 73, § IV. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
214 Id.  § IV.A. 




219 Id.  
220 Id. at § IV.C. R4.1.  
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When a federal agency is an affected party, efforts will be taken to manage the 
effects of the incident.221 This “line of effort” will be managed by the affected agency and 
will include broad-ranging efforts, from external affairs to ensuring operational 
continuity.222 When a private entity is the affected party, the government will not play an 
active role in managing the effects of the incident, “but it will remain cognizant of the 
affected entity’s response activities . . . .”223 For private sector entities, the most relevant 
government agency will generally be responsible for maintaining this awareness.224  
Given the shared responsibility held by both the government and private sector, it 
is also important for the private sector to cultivate situational awareness and develop threat 
response procedures. Developing industry guidelines and procedures is an effective way to 
share best practices and lessons learned. Such guidelines should be shared across company 
lines and with the government so that all industry partners can benefit from the information.  
                                                 









III. MARITIME INDUSTRY PRACTICE AND GUIDANCE 
 
The maritime industry has recently taken an increased notice of cyber risk. Three 
industry-leading organizations promulgated guidance in 2016 alone. These guidelines and 
suggestions highlight best practices and approaches to address maritime cyber risk 
management. While differing in scope, some basic principles emerge that are consistent 
throughout the guidelines. All three advocate integrating the NIST Framework principles 
into the industry’s cyber approaches. Additionally, increasing cyber awareness was 
recognized as a critical step in improving cybersecurity. While the American Bureau of 
Shipping Guidance Notes are by far the most thorough, each of the industry guidelines 
bring an important perspective to the table. These guidelines are important, not so much for 
the techniques and procedures they discuss, but for the fact that these highly influential 
maritime organizations are taking notice of the cyber threat and working to increase 
industry awareness.  
 
A. Baltic and International Maritime Council: The Guidelines on Cyber 
Security Onboard Ships 
 
“The Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships,” released by the Baltic and 
International Maritime Council (BIMCO) and several other influential maritime 
associations, is tailored to ship-owners and operators.225 The Guidelines are designed to 
give pointers on assessing operations and implementing the necessary actions and 
procedures to maintain cybersecurity aboard ships.226 The “Guidelines focus on the unique 
issues facing the shipping industry onboard ships.”227 Additionally, the Guidelines aim to 
improve awareness and understanding of good cybersecurity practices.228 
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The Guidelines set out a framework for cybersecurity awareness that includes six 
related steps: identify threats; identify vulnerabilities; assess risk exposure; develop 
protection and detection measures; establish contingency plans; and respond to cyber 
security incidents.229 To identify threats, a ship owner or operator must understand both the 
external and internal230 threat possibilities.231 While cyber risk is pervasive, each maritime 
entity needs to identify the specific risks to their operation, company, trade, or vessel.232 In 
identifying vulnerabilities, companies need to cultivate awareness “of any specific aspect of 
their operations that might increase their vulnerability to cyber incidents.”233 Additionally, 
the Guidelines point out that each entity must have knowledge and understanding of any 
protection measures already in place and the capabilities and limitations of these 
measures.234 
In assessing risk exposure, the Guidelines specify that any cyber protections 
already in place, along with the specific vulnerabilities that are found in the maritime 
industry, should be considered.235 The maritime realm presents a number of features that are 
potentially vulnerable to cyber threats. “Multiple stakeholders are often involved in the 
operation and chartering of a ship potentially resulting in lack of accountability for the IT 
infrastructure.”236 Additionally, ships regularly “interface[] with other parts of the global 
supply chain . . . [and share information] with shore-based service providers.”237 
Furthermore, many ship systems, including those related to environmental protection and 
safety, are controlled by computers.238 The Guidelines suggest using the NIST framework 
to assess current approaches and help identify risks.239 It is additionally suggested that each 
company should conduct an internal risk assessment to identify potential threats and survey 
current systems and procedures.240 This self-assessment should be followed up by a third-
party assessment to find any additional threat vectors missed during the self-assessment.241 
                                                 
229 Id. at 2. 
230 Id. 
231 BALTIC & INT’L MAR. COUNCIL, THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS 1 (Version 
1.1, 2016), https://www.marad.dot.gov/wp-
content/uploads/pdf/Guidelines_on_cyber_security_onboard_ships_version_1-1_Feb2016.pdf. (Internal 
threat possibilities are caused by insufficient awareness or inappropriate use). 
232 Id. at 3. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. at 2. 
235 Id. at 6. 
236 Id. 
237 BALTIC & INT’L MAR. COUNCIL, THE GUIDELINES ON CYBER SECURITY ONBOARD SHIPS 1 (Version 
1.1, 2016), https://www.marad.dot.gov/wp-
content/uploads/pdf/Guidelines_on_cyber_security_onboard_ships_version_1-1_Feb2016.pdf. 
 at 6. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. 
240 Id.  
 at 7. 
241 Id. at 10. 
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Reducing risk through the development of protection and detection measures is 
one of the most important steps in the cybersecurity awareness cycle. The Guidelines 
suggest implementing a layered approach that focuses on both technical and procedural 
defenses.242 Technical defenses are “focused on ensuring that onboard systems are designed 
and configured to be resilient to cyber-attacks.”243 Procedural defenses ensure that company 
policies, procedures (both safety and security), and access controls cover cyber 
vulnerabilities.244 One critical procedural control identified by the Guidelines is ensuring 
adequate training and awareness of personnel who operate and support the ship.245 
Each company should establish “appropriate contingency plans in order to 
effectively respond to cyber incidents.”246 These plans should be periodically tested so that 
personnel are familiar with the appropriate procedures to follow in the case of a cyber 
incident.247 The Guidelines further suggest that these plans should be available in some type 
of non-electronic form in case the cyber incident involves deleting or disrupting access to 
data.248 
According to the Guidelines, the final step, “respond to cyber security incidents,” 
should be informed by all the previous steps in the awareness cycle.249 Furthermore, the 
plans that were developed should be implemented, and their effectiveness measured.250 The 
Guidelines also specify that vulnerabilities and threats should be re-evaluated in light of the 
actual incident.251 
 
                                                 
242 Id. at 12. 




245 Id. at 15. 
246 Id. at 18. 
247 Id. 
248 Id. 
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B. International Maritime Organization: Interim Guidelines on Maritime 
Cyber Risk Management 
 
The Maritime Safety Committee of the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) approved and published “Interim Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management” 
in June 2016.252 The Committee’s reason for releasing the Guidelines was “the urgent need 
to raise awareness on cyber risk threats and vulnerabilities.”253 This short document gives a 
broad overview of items to consider related to cyber risk and references both the NIST 
Framework and the BIMCO Guidelines.254 The IMO Guidelines focus on a risk 
management approach and are designed to be incorporated with existing industry processes 
and procedures.255 
The Guidelines advocate creating a culture of cyber risk awareness that starts at 
the most senior level of management and flows throughout every level of an 
organization.256 In order to create and sustain this culture of risk awareness, the Guidelines 
focus on the same five functional elements identified in the NIST framework: identify, 
protect, detect, respond, and recover.257 The Guidelines note that the “functional elements 
are not sequential—all should be concurrent and continuous in practice and should be 
incorporated appropriately in a risk management framework.”258 
The “identify” element contains a suggestion that all personnel responsibilities 
and roles related to cybersecurity should be identified.259 Additionally, any critical data, 
capabilities, assets or systems that are potential vulnerable to cyber-attack should also be 
identified.260 Under “protect,” IMO advocates implementing risk control measures and 
processes that focus on protecting against a potential cyber event, and aim to ensure 
operational continuity in the face of such an event.261 The “detect,” “respond,” and 
“recover” elements focus on developing and implementing processes that effectively allow 
organizations to detect a cyber event, and respond in such a way that allows for timely 
restoral and recovery of critical systems.262  
 
                                                 




254 Id. at 4. 
255 Id. at 1. 
256 Id. at 3. 
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C. American Bureau of Shipping CyberSafety™ Guidance Notes 
 
In 2016, the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS)263 released a series of five 
volumes of CyberSafety™ Guidance Notes. This series is by far the most detailed guidance 
available for maritime cybersecurity. In the Foreword to the second volume of the series, 
ABS notes that “[e]xposure to these [cyber] threats has become pervasive due to the 
exponential growth of automation methods—and increasingly, autonomy—that has 
penetrated nearly all aspects of shipboard and offshore asset systems.”264 ABS points out 
that since such systems are integral to multiple facets of platform, ship, or asset operations, 
they are critical to operational safety and security.265 
Volume 1: Cybersecurity, published in February 2016, offers cybersecurity 
commentary and best practices.266 Cyber awareness should be “a foundational element of 
overall safety and security within and across the marine and offshore communities.”267 The 
volume is divided into five sections. The first two sections are more general in nature, 
discussing cybersecurity and giving advice on developing a cybersecurity program. The last 
three sections gather best practices that apply to marine and offshore operations. In 
discussing best practices, ABS advocates have developed nine basic capabilities as the 
foundation of a successful cybersecurity program.268 Once the baseline capabilities are 
established, additional capabilities should be developed to provide increasing breadth and 
depth to a cybersecurity program.269 
                                                 
263 ABS is an internationally recognized classification society. A classification society is “an 
organization that develops official standards for the shipping industry and checks the condition of ships 
and their equipment to make certain they are safe and meet the official standards of the shipping 
industry.” Classification Society, CAMBRIDGE BUSINESS ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/classification-society (last visited Mar. 28, 2017). 
264 American Bureau of Shipping, Guide for: Cybersecurity Implementation for the Marine and 
Offshore Industries, 2 ABS CYBERSAFETY™ ii (2016), http://ww2.eagle.org/content/dam/eagle/rules-
and-guides/current/other/251_cybersafetyV2/CyberSafety_V2_Cybersecurity_Guide_e.pdf. 
265 Id. 
266 American Bureau of Shipping, Guidance Notes on: the Application of Cybersecurity Principles to 
Marine And Offshore Operations, 1 ABS CYBERSAFETY™ ii (2016), 
http://ww2.eagle.org/content/dam/eagle/rules-and-
guides/current/other/250_cybersafetyV1/CyberSafety_V1_Cybersecurity_GN_e.pdf. 
267 Id. at ii.  
268 Id. at Fig. 1 (the basic capabilities are: “1-Exercise Best Practices; 2-Build the Security 
Organization; 3-Provision for Employee Awareness & Training; 4-Perform Risk Assessment; 5-
Provide Perimeter Defense; 6-Prepare for Incident Response & Recovery; 7-Provide Physical Security; 
8-Execute Access Management; and 9-Maintain Asset Management”). 
269 Id. at 5. 
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Volume 2, published in September 2016,270 establishes criteria to assess the 
readiness of assets and systems to prevent cyber incidents that could compromise the 
security and/or safety of assets, systems, and critical data.271 This volume, referred to as a 
Guide, “provides a model for implementing cybersecurity programs.”272 A ship under the 
classification purview of ABS that complies with the criteria and procedures identified in 
the Guide can be issued a “CyberSafety Management System Certificate (CMSC) and 
Notation . . . .”273 Additionally, a facility can be issued a “Certificate of Cyber Compliance 
(CCC).”274 The Guide lays out detailed procedures and processes for obtaining and 
maintaining certification.275 
Volume 3 is specifically focused on “data integrity.”276 This particular Guidance 
Note “is intended to help the industry realize the new benefits from data sources and data 
analytics systems via implementation of Data Integrity concepts.”277 The Note focuses on 
three main areas: characterizing data, securing data, and maintaining data integrity.278 
                                                 
270 Volumes 2–5 were all published in September 2016. 
271 See American Bureau of Shipping, supra note 263 at ii. 
272 Id. at 1. 
273 Id. (Vessels or “offshore assets not classed by ABS can be issued a ‘Statement of Fact’ when they 
are in conformance with the requirements of this Guide.”). 
274 Id. 
275 Id. at 2–4. 
276 American Bureau of Shipping, Guidance Notes on: Data Integrity for Marine and Offshore 
Operations, 3 ABS CYBERSAFETY™ ii (2016), http://ww2.eagle.org/content/dam/eagle/rules-and-
guides/current/other/252_cybersafetyV3/CyberSafety_V3_Data_Integrity_GN_e.pdf. 
277 Id. 
278 Id. at 3. 
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Volume 4, the Guide for Software Systems Verification, is focused on the 
software component of the control systems found onboard vessels (and offshore assets).279 
“The objective of this Guide is to reduce software-related incidents that could negatively 
affect the security, safety and performance of [computer-based control] systems.”280 The 
Guide presents various criteria and processes designed to verify the software portion of 
vessel control systems.281 ABS suggests that the “verification and validation organization” 
(used to perform software verification) should be a completely independent third-party.282  
Systems identified as of particular note include dynamic positioning, power management, 
thruster control, and blowout prevention.283 This Guide focuses exclusively on software and 
does not provide procedures to verify hardware.284 A vessel that conforms to the criteria and 
procedures outlined in the Guide may be granted an “SSV” notation to indicate 
compliance.285 
Volume 5 is designed to augment ABS’s Guide for Integrated Software Quality 
Management (ISQM).286 The ISQM “presents a risk-based software development and 
maintenance process . . . based upon internationally recognized standards.”287 This volume 
is designed mainly for software system providers involved in software design and quality 
assurance.288 
                                                 
279 American Bureau of Shipping, Guide for: Software Systems Verification, 4 ABS CYBERSAFETY™ ii 
(2016), http://ww2.eagle.org/content/dam/eagle/rules-and-
guides/current/other/253_cybersafetyV4/CyberSafety_V4_SSV_Guide_e.pdf. 
280 Id. at 1. 
281 Id. at 6. 
282 Id. at 3. Id. at 3. A Verification and Validation Organization (V&V) is “[t]he organization that 
develops the verification plan and performs the software verification of the control system.” The V&V 
must be an independent third party unless “special consideration” is requested from ABS and ABS 
determines that “sufficient independence” exists between the V&V and the system provider of the 
software being verified. 
283 Id. at 13–14; Occupational Safety & Health Admin., Oil and Gas Well Drilling and Servicing eTool: 
Drilling—Blowout Preventers, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/oilandgas/drilling/wellcontrol_bop.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2017) 
(a blowout preventer is designed to prevent blowout from occurring on an oil or gas well by “shut[ting] 
off the well hole and prevent[ing] the escape of the underground fluids”).  
284 4 AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING, supra note 278 at 8. 
285 Id. at 1. 
286 5 AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING, ABS CYBERSAFETY™ GUIDANCE NOTES ON SOFTWARE 
PROVIDER CONFORMITY PROGRAM ii (2016), http://ww2.eagle.org/content/dam/eagle/rules-and-
guides/current/other/254_cybersafetyV5/CyberSafety_V5_SPCP_GN_e.pdf. 
287 Id. 
288 Id. at 1. 
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The ABS standards are by far the most detailed and thorough currently available 
in the maritime domain. ABS, as a classification society, carries great weight in the 
maritime industry. “In the absence of classification societies for ships, there would be no 
benchmark or guideline standards for vessels and other constructions to adhere to.” 289 
Thus, the ABS CyberSafety™ Guidance Notes are a big step forward for the cybersecurity 
practices of the maritime industry and should be used as a template for future industry 
tactics, techniques, and procedures. Wide adoption of the ABS standards and creation of 
similar standards by other classification societies will allow the maritime industry to vastly 





Recently the U.S. government and the maritime industry have made good strides 
towards addressing cybersecurity issues in the maritime domain. However, while a good 
foundation currently exists, the industry and government need to continue to build on that 
foundation. The next steps include creating a pervasive culture of cyber risk awareness, 
ensuring that to the extent possible, MTSA required security plans address cyber risk, and 
revising current regulations or developing new regulations to focus on cybersecurity.  
 
A. Create a Culture of Cyber Risk Awareness 
 
All components of the marine transportation sector—government, port facilities, 
ship owners and operators, and other related entities—need to create a culture of cyber risk 
awareness. This culture needs to be supported by the highest levels of management and 
continue down through all personnel who access systems vulnerable to cyber-attack. 
Indeed, the BIMCO Guidelines specifically state that “[c]yber security should start at the 
senior management level of a company . . . .”290 The key to implementing such a culture is 
educating personnel on cyber vulnerabilities and types of threats. All of the materials 
reviewed for this Note advocated the creation of a total organizational culture that promoted 
cyber risk awareness. Until this type of culture is in place, and robust cyber awareness 
training and education is the norm, each organization is only as safe as its least educated 
employee with access to critical systems. 
 
B. Ensure MTSA Required Plans Address Cyber Risk 
 
The requirements promulgated under MTSA for area maritime, facility, and 
vessel security plans can be considered to include cyber elements through the 
communications and security systems section.291 In creating, updating, and evaluating 
vessel and facility security plans, emphasis should be placed on ensuring that cyber 
vulnerabilities are considered and addressed. The Coast Guard and AMS Committees 
should make addressing cyber risk a top priority. 
                                                 
289 Sharda, The Importance of Classification Societies in the Maritime Industry, MARINE INSIGHT (July 
21, 2016), http://www.marineinsight.com/maritime-law/the-importance-of-classification-societies-in-
the-maritime-industry/. 
290 BALTIC & INT’L MAR. COUNCIL, supra note 249 at 6. 
291 33 C.F.R. §§ 103.405, 104.405, 105.405 (2016). 
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The NIST Framework is a useful tool for companies and organizations to use in 
evaluating current approaches to cybersecurity. The Coast Guard, AMS Committees, 
classification societies, and maritime organizations should encourage use of the Framework 
when addressing cyber risk. The procedures put in place based on NIST Tiers and Profiles 
should be included in all MTSA required plans. 
Once MTSA required plans include cyber elements, the planned response to 
cyber-attacks should be regularly tested through drills and exercises. This will help ensure 
that employees and regulators are familiar with the policies and procedures set forth in the 
plans. It will also help identify any gaps in the plans. Identifying gaps in an environment 
where the risk is simulated and failure does not cause irreparable damage is preferable to 
discovering gaps during an actual attack. Furthermore, it will allow individuals who have 
been identified in the plans as having decision-making authority to practice making 
decisions related to cyber-attacks. 
The Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) should continue to emphasize 
cybersecurity as a critical priority. This funding opportunity can assist maritime companies 
and port stakeholders in paying for third-party assessments, or gaining equipment needed to 
close cyber vulnerabilities identified in such assessments.292 However, FEMA should 
ensure appropriate standards are promulgated for review of cyber projects under the PSGP. 
These standards should include provisions to allow both field and national level reviewers 
to consult with appropriate cyber experts during the review process. 
 
C. Develop Additional Maritime Focused Cybersecurity Legislation 
 
While MTSA can be read to include cyber, it would be better to either pass 
legislation that amended MTSA to explicitly include cybersecurity, or create new 
legislation specifically focused on cybersecurity in the maritime sector. Legislation 
designed to revise and amend MTSA would clearly signal that cyber threats and 
vulnerabilities are an important part of the security of United States seaports and vessels. 
Even MTSA was an amendment to an earlier act (the Merchant Marine Act of 1936).293 
Any revision of MTSA should update the definition of a transportation security incident to 
clearly include cyber-related disruptions.294 Additionally, any revision of MTSA (or new 
legislation) should include a requirement for vessels and facilities to create, test, and 
maintain plans to address cybersecurity vulnerabilities and responses to cyber-attacks. 
                                                 
292 See e.g. DHS Needs to Enhance Efforts to Address Port Cybersecurity, supra note 92 at 9. 
293 Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002). 
294 See U.S. Coast Guard, supra note 163. 
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2014 and 2015 saw a significant increase in cybersecurity legislation.295 
However, many additional governmental cybersecurity polices were promulgated by 
Executive Order and Presidential Policy Directive. With a major change in administration 
occurring in January 2016, it is unknown how many of these policies and procedures will 
remain in effect or what focus the new administration will have on cybersecurity.296 This 
uncertainty highlights the need for the creation of additional, durable cybersecurity 
legislation. The policies enacted through Executive Order and Presidential Policy Directive 
should be considered for inclusion in new or revised legislation. This way, the best and 
most effective of the practices identified in these presidential orders can be codified into 





Modern ships, facilities, and ports rely on integrated systems that are vulnerable 
to cyber-attacks. Thankfully, a major cyber-attack on the marine transportation sector has 
not yet occurred. However, significant manmade disruptions have shown the far-reaching 
effects such events could have on the prosperity and security of the United States.297 The 
capabilities of cyber-terrorists are continuing to grow and develop, presenting increased 
risks to the industrial control systems employed by the maritime industry. Both the 
maritime industry and the federal government have begun to address the cyber threat in the 
maritime domain. However, both the industry and government need to continue building on 
this foundation and harden marine transportation against cyber threats. It is critical for all 
maritime partners to implement a culture of cyber risk awareness. This culture must be 
pervasive, reaching from the highest levels of management to the workers at the most junior 
levels. Additionally, the government should work with industry to share information, 
leverage current regulations to their full extent, and create new regulations that specifically 
focus on cybersecurity. Only through continuous vigilance and a willingness to share 
information will the marine transportation sector be able to protect its critical intellectual 





                                                 
295 See supra Part II.C. Prior to 2014 no significant cybersecurity legislation had been enacted since 
2002, however, in 2014 five Acts were approved and another major Act was passed in 2015. 
296 Joseph J. Lazzarotti, President Donald J. Trump—What Lies Ahead for Privacy, Cybersecurity, e-
Communication?, 11/9/16 NAT’L L. REV., 2016 WLNR 34340881 (2016). 
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